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Three	  Perspectives	  on	  Human	  Beauty1	  Lisa	  Katharin	  Schmalzried	  
Abstract	  
Human	   beauty	   is	   no	   issue	   of	   contemporary	   aesthetics.	   To	   (re-­‐)approach	   this	   topic	  
philosophically,	   this	   paper	   outlines	   three	   different	   answers	   to	   the	   question	   whether	  
human	  beauty	  comes	  from	  within.	  According	  to	  a	  body-­‐centred	  theory,	  human	  beauty	  
solely	   depends	   on	   a	   person’s	   physical	   appearance.	   More	   precisely,	   human	   beauty	   is	  
identified	  with	  high	  physical	   attractiveness.	  A	  dualist	   theory	  distinguishes	   the	   ‘outer’	  
beauty	  of	  the	  physical	  appearance	  from	  the	  ‘inner’	  beauty	  of	  the	  character	  of	  a	  person.	  
So	  a	  beautiful	  person	  has	  to	  be	  outwardly	  and	  inwardly	  beautiful,	  that	  is,	  she	  has	  to	  be	  
highly	   physically	   attractive	   and	   has	   to	   have	   an	   amiable	   character.	   According	   to	   a	  
character-­‐expressionist	  theory,	  human	  beauty	  is	  bound	  to	  the	  appearance	  of	  a	  person,	  
but	   visible	   signs	   of	   a	   person’s	   character	   influence	   how	   someone	   appears	   to	   us.	   So	   a	  
beautiful	  person	  is	  not	  only	  highly	  physically	  attractive,	  but	  shows	  signs	  of	  an	  amiable	  
character.	   This	   paper	   argues	   for	   a	   character-­‐expressionist	   theory.	   Both	   the	   body-­‐
centred	  and	  the	  dualist	   theory	  assume	  that	  we	  can	  perceive	  a	  person’s	  mere	  physical	  
appearance.	   But	   if	   we	   see	   someone	   as	   a	   human	   being,	   we	   are	   aware	   of	   the	   human	  
duality	   between	   physical	   appearance	   and	   character.	   This	   awareness	   hampers	   us	   to	  
perceive	  them	  separately	  because	  we	  interpret	  certain	  facial	  expressions	  and	  gestures	  
as	  expressions	  of	  a	  person’s	  character.	  A	  character-­‐expressionist	  theory	  embraces	  this	  
inseperability-­‐problem.	   Furthermore,	   such	   a	   theory	   can	   explain	   two	   seemingly	  
contradictory	  intuitions,	  namely	  how	  beauty	  can	  be	  only	  skin-­‐deep	  and	  can	  come	  from	  
within.	  	  Whereas	  human	  beauty	  (and	  also	  beauty	  in	  general)2	  is	  no	  big	  issue	  of	  contemporary	  aesthetics,	  it	   is	   a	  big	   issue	  of	  our	   society.	  The	  mass	  media	   seem	   to	  obsess	  over	  beautiful	  people;	   at	   least,	  compared	   to	   real	   life,	   they	   definitely	   over-­‐represent	   good-­‐looking	   people.3	   And	   many	   of	   us,	  women	  as	  well	  as	  men,	  wish	  to	  become	  or	  stay	  beautiful	  and	  invest	  a	  lot	  of	  time,	  energy,	  and	  also	  money	   in	   their	   personal	   looks.	   Asked	   for	   reasons,	   one	   can	   hear	   that	   beauty	   is	   so	   important	  because	   it	   promises	   happiness.	   Beautiful	   people	   have	   advantages	   in	   their	   private	   and	   also	  professional	   life,	   advantages,	   which	   many	   of	   us	   associate	   with	   a	   good,	   happy	   life.	   Beautiful	  people	  more	  easily	  find	  a	  partner;	  beautiful	  children	  and	  students	  are	  better	  marked;	  beautiful	  job	  candidates	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  get	  the	  job	  and	  will	  earn	  more	  money	  than	  their	  not	  so	  good-­‐looking	  colleges;	  and	  so	  on.4	  Therefore	  it	  is	  not	  unreasonable	  to	  wish	  to	  be	  beautiful	  and	  to	  try	  with	   different	  means	   to	   achieve	   this	   goal.	   But	  what	   are	   the	   right	  means	   to	   become	   beautiful.	  Should	  one	  only	  care	  about	  one’s	  physical	  appearance?	  Underlying	  this	  question	  is	  another	  more	  basic	  one.	  Does	  only	  the	  outward,	  physical	  appearance	  of	  a	  person	  matter	  for	  her	  beauty,	  or	  does	  also	  her	  character	  play	  a	  role?	  In	  other	  words,	  does	  human	  beauty	  come	  from	  within?	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  sketch	  three	  different,	  but	  connected	  answers	  to	  this	  question:	  a	  body-­‐centred,	  a	  dualist,	   and	   a	   character-­‐expressionist	   answer.	   And	   it	   will	   argue	   in	   favour	   of	   a	   character-­‐expressionist	  solution.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	   Ästhetik	   und	   Kunstphilosophie,	   30.	   September	   2014,	   XXIII.	   Kongress	   der	   Deutschen	   Gesellschaft	   für	  Philosophie	  2014	  in	  Münster.	  2	  See,	  e.g.,	  Stolnitz,	  “‘Beauty’:	  Some	  Stages	  in	  the	  History	  of	  an	  Idea,”	  185.	  3	  See	  Gugenberger,	  Einfach	  Schön,	  104.	  4	  See,	  e.g.,	  Hamermesh,	  Beauty	  Pays;	  Gugenberger,	  Einfach	  Schön;	  Renz,	  Schönheit.	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   Three	  Perspectives	  on	  Human	  Beauty	   	  	   	  
I.	  An	  empirical-­‐grounded,	  body-­‐centred	  answer	  It	   is	  a	  widespread	  belief	   that	   the	  beauty	  of	  a	  person	  solely	  depends	  on	  how	  her	  body	  and	   face	  look	  like.	  The	  proverb	  “Beauty	  ins	  only	  skin	  deep”	  reflects	  this	  belief.	  And	  this	  is	  also	  the	  basic	  idea	  behind	  a	  body-­‐centred	  theory	  of	  human	  beauty.5	  The	   empirical	   research	   on	   attractiveness	   ties	   in	   with	   this	   basic	   idea	   and	   tries	   to	   answer	   the	  question	  how	  someone	  has	  to	  look	  like	  in	  order	  to	  be	  beautiful.	  For	  this	  purpose,	  it	  first	  assumes	  that	  a	  beautiful	  person	  is	  a	  physically	  attractive	  one,	  and	  then	  shows	  that	  what	  one	  person	  finds	  attractive	  is	  not	  so	  different	  from	  what	  another	  person	  finds	  attractive.	  Empirical	  research	  has	  identified	   some	   interpersonal	   and	   intercultural	   stable	   features	   of	   human	   attractiveness,	   for	  example,	  youthfulness,	  clear	  complexion,	  symmetry,	  averageness,	  and	  for	  women	  a	  waist-­‐to-­‐hip	  ratio	   of	   0,7	   and	   a	   childlike	   face.6	   Considered	   evolutionarily,	   we	   find	   these	   features	   attractive	  because	   they	   are	   reliable	   signs	   of	   fitness	   and	   promise	   reproductive	   success.7	   So	   physical	  attractiveness	  can	  be	  explained	  in	  objective	  terms.	  This	  empirical-­‐grounded,	  body-­‐centred	  theory	  has	  to	  meet	  at	  least	  three	  objections.	  First,	  beauty	  seems	  to	  be	  much	  more	  exclusive	  than	  attractiveness.	  The	  threshold	  to	  call	  someone	  beautiful	  is	  much	  higher	  than	  the	  threshold	  to	  call	  someone	  attractive.8	  This	  objection	  can	  be	  met	  if	  beauty	  is	  not	  simply	  attractiveness,	  but	  high	  attractiveness.9	  But	  if	  judging	  someone	  to	  be	  highly	  attractive	  means	  that	  one	  feels	  a	  strong	  sexual	  desire,	  this	  also	  seems	  to	  be	  wrong.10	  I	  can	  strongly	  sexually	  desire	   a	   person	  who	   I	   do	  not	   find	  beautiful.	   And	   I	   can	   judge	   a	   person	   to	   be	   beautiful	  without	  sexually	   desiring	   her.	   If	   I	   am	   happily	   married,	   for	   example,	   I	   may	   only	   sexually	   desire	   my	  partner,	  but	  I	  can	  still	  see	  the	  beauty	  of	  other	  persons.	  Or	  a	  heterosexual	  man	  or	  woman	  can	  is	  able	   to	   see	   the	   beauty	   of	   another	   man	   or	   woman.	   But	   attractiveness	   does	   not	   have	   to	   be	  understood	  in	  mere	  sexual	  terms.	  If	  one	  judges	  a	  person	  to	  be	  physically	  attractive,	  the	  sight	  of	  this	  other	  person	  (immediately)	  pleases,	  one	  is	  drawn	  towards	  this	  person,	  becomes	  interested	  in	  her,	   and	   certain	  desires	  are	   triggered,	   I	   assume.	   Seeing	  an	  attractive	  person	  can	   trigger	   the	  wish	  to	  get	  to	  know	  this	  person	  and	  form	  a	  relationship,	  not	  necessarily	  a	  sexual	  one,	  with	  her.	  I	  assume	  that	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  think	  of	  a	  person	  who	  we	  judge	  to	  be	  beautiful,	  but	  is	  not	  in	  this	  wider	  sense	  attractive.	  Secondly,	  one	  might	  wonder	  whether	  it	  is	  indeed	  possible	  to	  fully	  decode	  the	  “secret	  of	  beauty”	  in	  terms	  of	  objective	  features	  of	  attractiveness.	  In	  the	  history	  of	  philosophical	  aesthetics,	  trying	  to	   find	   an	   objective	   beauty	   formula	   has	   proved	   to	   be	   a	   rather	   frustrating	   business.	   Beauty	  formulas	   seem	   either	   to	   be	   too	   broad,	   too	   narrow,	   or	   too	   vague.	   A	   defender	   of	   the	   empirical-­‐grounded	  theory	  can	  admit	  that	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  find	  a	  general	  beauty	  formula,	  but	  add	  that	  she	  is	  only	  concerned	  with	  a	   formula	  of	  human	  beauty.	  With	  the	  help	  of	  empirical	   investigations	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  See	  Levinson,	  “Beauty	  Is	  Not	  One,”	  §	  IV.	  	  6	  For	  a	  more	  detailed	  overview	  of	  the	  results	  of	  the	  empirical	  research	  on	  attractiveness	  see,	  e.g.,	  Gründel,	  “Attraktivitätsforschung:	  Auf	  der	  Suche	  nach	  der	  Formel	  der	  Schönheit”;	  Renz,	  Schönheit,	  part	  I.	  	  7	  See,	  e.g.,	  Menninghaus,	  Das	  Versprechen	  der	  Schönheit,	  chap.	  I/II.	  	  8	  See	  Levinson,	  “Beauty	  Is	  Not	  One,”	  §	  IV.	  9	  See,	  e.g.,	  Campell,	  Converse	  and	  Rodgers,	  The	  Quality	  of	  American	  Life,	  400.	  	  10	  See	  Burke,	  A	  Philosophical	  Enquiry,	  83.	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  biological	  explanations,	  we	  can	  explain	  some	  day	  what	  makes	  a	  person	  beautiful.11	  But	  is	  this	  so?	  One	   can	   admit	   that	   empirical	   research	   has	   found	   some	   typical	   features	   of	   attractiveness,	   but	  question	  whether	   they	  ever	  can	  be	  put	   together	   in	  a	  generally	  valid	   formula	  of	  human	  beauty.	  Sometimes	  a	  little	  ‘imperfection’,	  a	  little	  ‘flaw’	  contributes	  to	  the	  beauty	  of	  a	  person,	  although	  the	  same	   feature	   does	   not	   tend	   to	   beautify	   someone	   else.	   Think	   for	   example	   of	   Brigitte	   Bardot’s	  tooth	   gap	   or	   Cindy	   Crawford’s	   beauty	   spot	   above	   her	   mouth.	   And,	   secondly,	   if	   one	   tries	   to	  explain	  what	  makes	  a	  person	  beautiful,	  mostly	  something	  unexplainable	  remains.	  The	  beauty	  of	  a	  person	  partly	  depends	  on	  something	  special,	  on	  a	  kind	  of	  mysterious,	  unpredictable	  x-­‐factor,	  it	  seems.	  So	  also	  human	  beauty	  might	  be	  never	  be	  fully	  decoded.	  This	  consideration	  does	  not	  defeat	  the	  whole	  empirical-­‐grounded,	  body-­‐centred	  theory,	  only	  its	  aspiration	  to	  fully	  decode	  human	  beauty	  in	  objective	  terms.	  Generally	  considered,	  a	  remarkable	  feature	  of	  judgements	  of	  beauty	  is	  that	  they	  can	  neither	  be	  fully	  explained	  in	  mere	  objective,	  nor	  in	  mere	  subjective	  terms.12	  On	  the	  one	  side,	  judgements	  of	  beauty	  seem	  to	  be	  subjective.	  As	  the	  well-­‐known	   proverb	   “There	   is	   no	   accounting	   for	   taste”	   states,	   arguing	   about	   judgements	   of	  beauty	  is	  kind	  of	  pointless.	  Judgements	  of	  beauty	  depend	  on	  whether	  something	  pleases	  us,	  on	  whether	  we	   love	   something,	   on	  whether	  we	  are	   attracted	  by	   something.	  And,	   as	  we	  have	   just	  seen,	  we	  have	  a	  hard	  time	  trying	  to	   formulate	  any	  general	  beauty	   formulas.	   In	  the	  end,	  beauty	  remains	  unexplainable.	  However,	   a	   fully	   subjective	   account	   does	  not	   convince:	   people	   tend	   to	  search	   for	  objective	   features	  of	   beautiful	   objects,	   and	   this	   search	   is	  not	   totally	   vain.	  They	   also	  argue	  with	  each	  other	  if	  they	  disagree	  on	  matters	  of	  beauty.	  If	  someone	  judges	  something	  to	  be	  beautiful,	   she	  wants	   to	   say	  more	   than	   that	   the	   objects	   simply	   pleases	   her.	   She	   demands	   from	  others	   to	   agree.	   I	   would	   say	   that	   a	   theory	   of	   beauty	   should	   embrace	   this	   shifting	   between	  subjective	  and	  objective	  explanation-­‐modes.	  The	  empirical-­‐grounded,	  body-­‐centred	  theory	  does	  justice	   to	   the	  subjectivity	  of	   judgements	  of	  beauty	  by	  saying	  that	  beauty	   is	  high	  attractiveness,	  and	  it	  does	  justice	  to	  the	  objectivity	  of	  judgements	  of	  beauty	  by	  partly	  explaining	  beauty	  in	  terms	  of	  objective	  features	  of	  attractiveness.	  	  The	  third	  objection	  raises	  the	  initial	  question	  of	  this	  paper:	  is	  the	  body-­‐centred	  theory	  right	  that	  human	  beauty	  does	  only	  depend	  on	  the	  physical	  appearance?	  Asked	  for	  reasons	  why	  someone	  finds	  a	  person	  beautiful,	  of	  course,	  bodily	  and	  facial	  features	  are	  mentioned,	  but	  one	  often	  also	  refers	  to	  the	  character	  of	  the	  other	  person.	  It	  seems	  as	  if	  the	  character	  of	  a	  person	  at	  least	  partly	  influences	  her	  beauty.	  The	  body-­‐centred	  theory	  cannot	  grasp	  this	  intuition.	  	  
II.	  A	  dualist	  answer	  The	   last	  point	   leads	   to	   the	  second	  answer	   to	   the	  question	  whether	  human	  beauty	  comes	   from	  within.	  A	  dualist	  theory	  distinguishes	  between	  two	  kinds	  of	  human	  beauty,	  the	  ‘outer’	  beauty	  of	  the	  physical	  appearance	  and	  the	  ‘inner’	  beauty	  of	  the	  character	  (or	  soul)	  of	  a	  person.	  To	  be	  truly	  and	   fully	   beautiful	   it	   is	   not	   enough	   to	   be	   only	   physically	   beautiful,	   but	   one	   should	   also	   be	  inwardly	  beautiful.	  This	  reflects	  the	  ancient	  ideal	  of	  the	  kalokagathía:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  See,	  e.g.,	  Gründel,	  “Attraktivitätsforschung:	  Auf	  der	  Suche	  nach	  der	  Formel	  der	  Schönheit,”	  69-­‐70.	  	  12	  See,	  e.g.,	  Hume,	  Of	  the	  Standard	  of	  Taste;	  Kant,	  Kritik	  der	  Urteilskraft,	  §	  56.	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   Three	  Perspectives	  on	  Human	  Beauty	   	  	   	  Then	  […]	  when	  there	  is	  a	  coincidence	  of	  a	  beautiful	  disposition	  in	  the	  soul	  and	  corresponding	  and	   harmonious	   beauties	   of	   the	   same	   type	   in	   the	   bodily	   form—is	   not	   this	   the	   fairest	  spectacle	  for	  one	  who	  is	  capable	  of	  its	  contemplation?13	  What	   kind	   of	   character	   is	   called	   beautiful?	   An	   answer	   to	   this	   question	   should	   fulfil	   two	  conditions.	  First,	   it	   should	  embrace	  our	  pre-­‐theoretical	   intuitions	  about	  which	   character	   traits	  are	  relevant	  for	  the	  attribution	  of	  inner	  beauty.	  Secondly,	  it	  should	  explain	  why	  such	  a	  character	  (and	  only	  such	  a	  character)	  is	  called	  beautiful.	  	  Inner	  beauty	  is	  often	  equated	  with	  moral	  beauty:14	  a	  person	  is	  inwardly	  beautiful	  insofar	  as	  she	  has	   moral	   character	   traits,	   that	   is,	   insofar	   as	   she	   reliably	   acts	   (thinks	   and	   feels)	   morally.	  However,	  this	  proposal	  does	  not	  do	  justice	  to	  our	  intuitions	  about	  inner	  beauty.	  First,	  it	  does	  not	  mention	   the	  motivation	   behind	   an	   action.	   But	   an	   inwardly	   beautiful	   person	   does	   not	   only	   act	  morally	  only	  because	  she	  feels	  obliged	  to.15	  Rather	  she	  acts	  morally	  out	  of	  concern	  and	  love	  for	  others.	  And	  also	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  easiness	  is	  important.	  An	  inwardly	  beautiful	  person	  does	  not	  struggle	  too	  much	  to	  act	  morally.	  Schiller	  speaks	  of	  a	  beautiful	  soul	  if	  to	  act	  morally	  has	  become	  someone’s	  second	  nature.16	  Furthermore,	  not	  all	  moral	  actions	  equally	  matter	  for	  the	  attribution	  of	   inner	  beauty.	  To	  pay	  one’s	   taxes	  seems	   to	  be	   less	   important	   than	   to	  help	  another	  person	   in	  need,	   for	  example.	  And	  not	  only	  moral	   character	   traits	  are	   important.	   Intelligence,	  humour,	  or	  optimism,	  for	  example,	  are	  also	  mentioned	  if	  one	  speaks	  about	  a	  beautiful	  character.17	  	  The	  philosophical	  roots	  of	  speaking	  about	  inner	  beauty	  lie	  in	  Plato’s	  writings.	  Plato	  claims	  that	  the	   good	   is	   beautiful.18	   In	   this	   sense,	   a	   good,	   that	   is,	   virtuous	   character	   is	   a	   beautiful	   one.	  Connecting	   this	   idea	   with	   Aristotle’s	   theory	   of	   virtue,	   this	   proposal	   embraces	   our	   intuitions	  about	  inner	  beauty	  rather	  well.	  First,	  possessing	  a	  virtue	  means	  that	  one	  acts	  according	  to	  this	  virtue	  without	  much	   struggle	   and	   takes	  pleasure	   in	   the	   virtuous	   action.19	   Secondly,	  Aristotle’s	  list	  of	  virtues	  not	  only	  comprises	  in	  a	  narrow	  sense	  moral	  virtues.	  Also	  socially	  desirable	  virtues	  like	   good	   temper	   or	   friendliness	   are	   included.20	   And	   by	   stressing	   the	   importance	   of	   the	  intellectual	   virtues	   one	   can	   come	   to	   terms	  with	   the	   idea	   that	   also	   intelligence	   and	   skilfulness	  make	   someone	   inwardly	   beautiful.	   The	   only	   shortcoming	   of	   this	   proposal	   is	   that	   it	   cannot	  explain	  why	  not	  all	  morally	  virtuous	  character	  traits	  and	  their	  corresponding	  actions	  are	  equally	  important	  for	  the	  attribution	  of	  inner	  beauty.	  Aside	   from	   this	   problem,	   one	  might	   ask	  why	   such	   an	  Aristotelian	   virtuous	   character	   and	  only	  such	   a	   character	   is	   a	   beautiful	   one.	   In	  Gorgias,	   a	   possible	   justification	   is	   shortly	  mentioned:	   a	  virtuous	   character	   is	   especially	   ordered.21	   And	   in	   the	   Republic,	   a	   virtuous	   character	   is	   called	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Plato,	  Republic,	  402d.	  	  14	  See,	  e.g.,	  Berkeley,	  Alciphron,	  120-­‐121;	  Cooper,	  Characteristicks	  of	  Men,	  Manners,	  Opinions,	  Times,	  14;	  Hume,	  An	  Inquiry	  Concerning	  the	  Principles	  of	  Morals,	  5;	  McGinn,	  Ethics,	  Evil,	  and	  Fiction,	  chap.	  5.	  15	  See	  Schiller,	  Kallias	  oder	  über	  die	  Schönheit.	  Über	  Anmut	  und	  Würde,	  29.	  16	  See	  Schiller,	  Kallias	  oder	  über	  die	  Schönheit.	  Über	  Anmut	  und	  Würde,	  111.	  17	  See,	  e.g.,	  Gaut,	  Art,	  Emotion	  and	  Ethics,	  120;	  Reid,	  “Essay	  VIII	  of	  Taste,”	  792.	  18	  See,	  e.g.,	  Plato,	  Symposium,	  201c.	  19	  See	  Aristotle,	  Nikomachische	  Ethik,	  1104	  b;	  1105	  b.	  	  20	  See	  Aristotles,	  Nikomachische	  Ethik,	  book	  IV.	  	  21	  See	  Plato,	  Gorgias,	  506e.	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  on	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  Beauty	   	  	   	  harmonious.22	   According	   to	   a	   classical	   theory	   of	   beauty,	   beauty	   depends	   on	   harmony	   and	  order.23	   The	   reciprocity	   thesis	  might	   explain	   in	  which	   sense	   a	   virtuous	   character	   is	   especially	  ordered	  and	  harmonious:	   if	  you	  have	  one	  virtue,	  you	  have	  all	  of	  them.24	  Virtues	  hang	  together.	  You	   cannot	   take	   one	   apart	   without	   destroying	   the	   whole	   unity	   of	   a	   virtuous	   character.	   This	  seems	   to	   speak	   for	   a	   special	   order	   and	   harmony	   among	   the	   virtues.	   However,	   the	   reciprocity	  thesis	   is	   rather	   contra-­‐intuitive.25	   And	   it	   is	   therefore	   in	   need	   of	   a	   good	   justification.	   Aristotle	  gives	  the	   following	   justification	  of	   this	   thesis.	  Possessing	  a	  virtue	   implies	  being	  prudent,	  and	   if	  you	  are	  prudent,	   then	  you	  have	  all	   of	   the	  other	  virtues.26	  But	  Aristotle	   also	  argues	   that	   a	   self-­‐restrained	  person	  is	  prudent,	  but	  not	  fully	  virtuous.27	  This	   leads	  to	  a	  weaker	  claim:	  if	  someone	  has	  acquired	  one	  virtue,	   she	   is	  prudent	  and	  has	   thereby	  acquired	   the	  prerequisite	  of	   all	   other	  virtues.28	  But	   if	   a	  virtuous	  character	   is	  ordered	  and	  harmonious	   in	   this	   sense,	   then	  one	  would	  have	   to	  call	  a	  person	  who	  has	  acquired	  only	  one	  virtue	  beautiful,	  and	   this	   is	  contra-­‐intuitive,	   I	  assume.	  Burke	   proposes	   another	   analysis	   of	   inner	   beauty.	   He	   connects	   beauty	   with	   love.29	   Hence	   a	  beautiful	  character	  is	  an	  amiable	  character:30	  	  Those	  [virtues]	  which	  engage	  our	  hearts,	  which	  impress	  us	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  loveliness,	  are	  the	  softer	  virtues;	  easiness	  of	  temper,	  compassion,	  kindness	  and	  liberality	  […]31	  Burke	  does	  not	  think	  of	   love	  in	  purely	  sexual	  terms.32	  So,	  one	  can	  develop	  his	   idea	  further	  and	  say	  that	  an	  amiable	  character	  is	  in	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  sense	  attractive.	  An	  attractive	  character	  trait	  draws	  you	  towards	  the	  person	  bearing	  this	  character	  trait	  and	  triggers	  the	  wish	  to	  form	  a	  relationship	  with	  this	  person.	  In	  other	  words,	  an	  attractive,	  amiable	  character	  trait	  is	  a	  character	  trait	  we	  are	  looking	  for	  in	  good	  friends.	  	  This	  proposal	   fulfils	   the	   first	   requirement	   for	  an	  analysis	  of	   inner	  beauty	  even	  better	   than	   the	  virtue-­‐analysis.	  Virtuous	  and	  moral	  character	  traits	  matter	   for	   friendship.33	  But	  not	  all	  of	   them	  matter	  equally.34	  Helping	  another	  person,	  being	  generous,	  or	   loyal	  count	  more	  than	  honesty	   in	  tax	  matters.	   It	   also	   helps	   to	   explain	  why	   the	  motivation	   behind	   an	   action	  matters.	   A	   friend	   is	  expected	   to	   chose	  a	  moral	  action	  not	  only	  because	   she	   feels	  obliged	   to	  do	   so,	  but	  because	   she	  really	  cares	  for	  another	  person.35	  Furthermore,	  also	  humour,	  optimism,	  and	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  See	  Plato,	  Republic,	  402d.	  23	  See,	  e.g.,	  Tatarkiewicz,	  “The	  Great	  Theory	  of	  Beauty	  and	  Its	  Decline.”	  24	  See	  Aristotle,	  Nikomachische	  Ethik,	  1144	  b	  36–1145	  a	  1.	  	  25	  See,	  e.g.,	  Williams,	  Ethics	  and	  the	  Limits	  of	  Philosophy,36.	  26	  See	  Aristotle,	  Nikomachische	  Ethik,	  1144	  b	  36–1145	  a	  1.	  	  27	  See	  Aristotle,	  Nikomachische	  Ethik,	  1152	  a.	  	  28	  See	  also	  Telfer,	  “The	  Unity	  of	  the	  Moral	  Virtues	  in	  Aristotle's	  ‘Nicomachean	  Ethics’,”	  40.	  	  29	  See	  Burke,	  A	  Philosophical	  Enquiry,	  83.	  	  30	  See	  also	  Reid,	  “Essay	  VIII	  of	  Taste,”	  791.	  31	  Burke,	  A	  Philosophical	  Enquiry,	  100.	  	  32	  See	  Burke,	  A	  Philosophical	  Enquiry,	  83.	  33	  See,	  e.g.,	  Aristoteles,	  Nikomachische	  Ethik,	  1156	  b;	  Kant,	  „Freundschaft	  als	  Maximum	  der	  Wechselliebe.”	  34	  See,	  e.g,	  Burke,	  A	  Philosophical	  Enquiry,	  100;	  Reid,	  “Essay	  VIII	  of	  Taste,”	  792.	  	  35	  See,	  e.g.,	  Railton,	  “Alienation,	  Consequentialism,	  and	  the	  Demands	  of	  Morality,”	  212-­‐215.	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  intelligence	  are	  often	  mentioned	  as	  important	  for	  friendship.36	  They	  tend	  to	  make	  interpersonal	  relationships	  easier	  and	  more	  interesting.	  	  This	  proposal	  can	  also	  give	   two	  explanations	  why	  we	  call	  such	  an	  amiable	  character	  beautiful.	  First,	  a	  beautiful	  character	  and	  a	  beautiful	  body	  are	  both	  attractive	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  evoke	  pleasurable	   sensations	   and	   trigger	   the	   wish	   to	   get	   to	   know	   that	   person	   and	   to	   form	   a	  relationship	  with	  her.	  Secondly,	  the	  current	  proposal	  can	  explain	  why	  also	  judgements	  of	  inner	  beauty	  evade	  purely	  subjective	  as	  well	  as	  purely	  objective	  explanations,	  and	  this	  is	  a	  remarkable	  feature	   of	   judgements	   of	   beauty.	   Friendship	   is	   a	   personal	   matter	   strongly	   depending	   on	   our	  affection	  for	  another	  person.	  And	  it	  is	  up	  to	  a	  certain	  degree	  unexplainable.37	  Montaigne	  writes	  in	  his	  essay	  “Of	  Friendship:”	  	  If	  a	  man	  should	  importune	  me	  to	  give	  a	  reason	  why	  I	  loved	  him,	  I	  find	  it	  could	  no	  otherwise	  be	  expressed,	  than	  by	  making	  answer:	  because	  it	  was	  he,	  because	  it	  was	  I.38	  	  But	   friendship	   is	  not	   totally	  unexplainable.	  Since	  the	  antiquity,	  philosophers	  have	  searched	  for	  and	   have	   formulated	   typical	   features	   of	   good	   friendship,	   thereby	   stressing	   the	   objectivity	   of	  friendship.	  And	  if	  I	  think	  that	  someone	  would	  be	  a	  good	  friend,	  I	  am	  prepared	  to	  argue	  with	  you	  if	  you	  disagree.	  	  If	  one	  accepts	  this	  analysis	  of	  inner	  beauty,	  one	  can	  formulate	  a	  dualist	  view	  on	  human	  beauty:	  a	  person	   is	  beautiful	   if	   she	   is	  highly	  physically	   attractive	   and	  has	   an	  amiable	   character.	  But	  one	  might	   object	   that	   such	   a	   dualist	   theory	   makes	   the	   mistake	   to	   understand	   the	   proverb	   “True	  beauty	  comes	  from	  within”	  too	  literally	  and	  overlooks	  that	  speaking	  about	  inner	  beauty	  can	  only	  be	  meant	  metaphorically.	  	  But	  neither	  common	  intuitions,	  nor	  the	  philosophical	  debate	  agrees	  on	  whether	  ‘inner	  beauty’	  is	  a	  metaphor.	   If	   one	   adopts	   the	   dualist	   interpretation	   of	   the	   proverb	   “True	   beauty	   comes	   from	  within,”	  inner	  beauty	  is	  literal	  beauty.	  Otherwise	  it	  could	  not	  be	  true	  beauty.	  But	  the	  also	  already	  mentioned	   proverb	   “Beauty	   is	   only	   skin	   deep”	   contradicts	   this	   assumption.	   Philosophical	  discourse	   reflects	   this	   disagreement.	   Some	  writers	   treat	   inner	   beauty	   as	   a	  metaphor	   like,	   for	  example,	   Kant	   or	   Burke;39	   some	   as	   literal	   beauty	   like,	   for	   example,	   Plato	   or	   Gaut;40	   and	   some	  even	  as	  the	  prototype	  of	  beauty	  like,	  for	  example,	  Plotin,	  Reid,	  or	  Cousin.41	  	  For	  Gaut,	  only	  if	  something	  blocks	  a	  literal	  interpretation,	  ‘inner	  beauty’	  should	  be	  considered	  to	  be	   a	   metaphor.42	   What	   could	   block	   a	   literal	   interpretation?	   First,	   beauty	   strikes	   quite	  immediately.43	  We	  do	  not	  have	  to	  think	  much	  about	  whether	  something	  is	  beautiful.	  We	  simply	  see	   or	   hear	   it.	   This	   leads	   to	   the	   second	   feature	   of	   beauty:	   beauty	  depends	   (at	   least	   partly)	   on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  See,	  e.g.,	  Reid,	  “Essay	  VIII	  of	  Taste,”	  792.	  37	  See,	  e.g.,	  Telfer,	  “Friendship,”	  226.	  	  38	  Montaigne,	  “Of	  Friendship,”	  paragraph	  12	  (my	  italics).	  	  39	  See,	  e.g.,	  Burke,	  A	  Philosophical	  Enquiry,	  101-­‐102;	  Kant,	  Kritik	  der	  Urteilskraft,	  AA	  V	  353.	  	  40	  See,	  e.g.,	  Gaut,	  Art,	  Emotion	  and	  Ethics,	  114-­‐127;	  Plato,	  Symosium.	  	  41	   See,	   e.g.,	   Alision,	  Essays	   on	   the	   nature	   and	   principles	   of	   taste;	   Cousin	  The	   Philosophy	   of	   the	   Beautiful.	  Plotinus,	  “On	  Beauty”;	  Reid,	  “Essay	  VIII	  of	  Taste”.	  42	  See	  Gaut,	  Art,	  Emotion	  and	  Ethics,	  124.	  	  43	   See,	   e.g.,	   Addision,	   The	   Spectator;	   Aquinas,	   Summa	   Theologica,	   211;	   Hutcheson,	   An	   Inquiry	   into	   the	  
Original	  of	  Our	  Ideas	  of	  Beauty	  and	  Virtue,	  25.	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  direct	  sensory	  perception,	  normally	  on	  visual	  or	  acoustical	  perception,	  one	  might	  think.44	  These	  two	  features	  support	  a	  metaphorical	  interpretation	  of	  inner	  beauty.	  First,	  one	  needs	  time	  to	  get	  to	  know	  a	  person,	  to	  understand	  what	  kind	  of	  person	  she	  is	  and	  what	  character	  traits	  she	  has.	  One	  cannot	  immediately	  perceive	  a	  person’s	  inner	  beauty,	  as	  one	  cannot	  immediately	  decide	  on	  whether	   someone	   would	   be	   a	   good	   friend	   and	   behaves	   like	   one.	   And	   secondly,	   one	   cannot	  directly	   see	  or	  hear	   the	   character	  of	   a	  person.	  One	  has	   to	  deduce	   from	   the	  behaviour,	   actions,	  and	   statements	   of	   a	   person	   what	   kind	   of	   character	   she	   has.	   So	   one	   cannot	   immediately	   and	  directly	  see	  (or	  hear)	  the	  inner	  beauty	  of	  a	  person.	  	  
III.	  A	  character-­‐expressionist	  answer	  Besides	   the	   question	   whether	   ‘inner	   beauty’	   is	   a	   metaphor,	   another	   problem	   arises	   for	   the	  dualist	  theory	  and	  also	  for	  the	  body-­‐centred	  theory.	  Both	  theories	  assume	  that	   it	   is	  possible	  to	  perceive	  the	  mere	  physical	  appearance	  of	  a	  person.	  But	  think	  of	  an	  everyday	  situation	  in	  which	  you	   meet	   another	   person.	   Even	   if	   you	   try	   to	   concentrate	   only	   on	   her	   physical	   appearance,	   I	  assume,	  you	  rather	  quickly	  start	  to	  think	  about	  what	  kind	  of	  person	  she	  is.	  We	  have	  learned	  from	  experience	   to	  read	  certain	   facial	  expressions	  and	  gestures	  as	  expressions	  of	   the	  character	  of	  a	  person.	  We	  see	  the	  look	  in	  someone’s	  eyes,	  and	  this	  gives	  us	  clues	  to	  what	  kind	  of	  person	  she	  is,	  or	  at	  least	  we	  hope	  so.	  So	  how	  someone	  appears	  to	  us	  does	  not	  only	  depend	  on	  bodily	  features,	  or	  as	  Nehamas	  says:	  In	  other	  words,	  psychological	  and	  bodily	  features	  interpenetrate	  […]45	  Why	   is	   this	   so?	   If	   we	   see	   someone	   as	   a	   human	   being,	   we	   know	   that	   the	   body	   that	  we	   see	   is	  animated.	  This	  brings	  along	   the	  awareness	  of	  a	  kind	  of	  human	  duality.	  We	   tend	   to	  distinguish	  between	   the	   outward	   appearance	   and	   the	   inner	   life	   of	   a	   person,	   or	   between	   her	   body	   and	  character.	  Seeing	  someone	  as	  a	  person	  means	  to	  be	  aware	  that	  she	  is	  more	  than	  her	  looks.	  And	  exactly	  this	  awareness	  makes	  it	  so	  difficult	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  mere	  physical	  appearance	  of	  a	  person.	  We	  immediately	  start	   to	   look	  for	  visible	  signs	  of	  what	  kind	  of	  person	  someone	   is.	   In	  short,	   the	  appearance	  of	  a	  person	  never	  is	  the	  mere	  physical	  appearance.	  	  This	   inseperability-­‐problem	  does	  not	   claim	   that	   it	   is	  per	   se	   impossible	   to	   judge	  human	  beings	  only	   based	   on	   their	   visible	   physical	   features.	   Under	   certain	   circumstances,	   this	   might	   be	  possible.	  If	  I	  show	  you	  a	  photo	  of	  a	  nude	  person,	  standing	  in	  front	  of	  a	  monochrome	  wall,	  looking	  at	   you	  with	   the	  most	  neutral	   facial	   expression,	   you	  might	  be	   able	   to	   concentrate	   on	  her	  mere	  physical	  appearance.	  But	  such	  a	  situation	  is	  rather	  artificial.	  	  If	   the	   inseperability-­‐problem	   describes	   an	   observation	   about	   how	   we	   tend	   to	   perceive	   other	  human	  beings,	  why	  is	  this	   important	  for	  a	  theory	  of	  human	  beauty?	  A	  theory	  of	  human	  beauty	  should	  help	  to	  understand	   judgements	   like	  “X	   is	  a	  beautiful	  person.”	  or	  “Person	  x	   is	  beautiful.”	  And	  if	  such	  a	  theory	  analyses	  human	  beauty	  at	  least	  partly	  as	  mere	  physical	  beauty,	  it	  assumes	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  judge	  human	  beings	  only	  based	  on	  their	  physical	  appearance.	  But	  if	  this	  is	  only	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	   See,	   e.g.,	   Addision,	   The	   Spectator;	   Burke,	   A	   Philosophical	   Enquiry,	   83;	   Zangwill,	   “Aesthetic/Sensory	  Dependence,”	  127-­‐145.	  45	  Nehamas,	  Only	  a	  Promise	  of	  Happiness,	  68.	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  possible	  under	  exceptional	  circumstances,	  most	  of	  our	  statements	  about	  human	  beauty	  remain	  unexplained.	  Therefore,	  a	  theory	  of	  human	  beauty	  should	  embrace	  the	  inseperability-­‐problem.	  	  A	  character-­‐expressionist	  theory	  of	  human	  beauty	  can	  do	  this	  job.	  The	  basic	  idea	  behind	  such	  a	  theory	  is	  that	  one	  should	  give	  up	  the	  clear	  distinction	  between	  the	  ‘outer’	  beauty	  of	  the	  physical	  appearance	  and	  ‘inner’	  beauty	  of	  the	  character.	  Such	  a	  distinction	  cannot	  be	  drawn	  because	  the	  appearance	   of	   a	   person	   is	   not	   only	   her	   physical	   appearance.	   Reading	   some	   bodily	   and	   facial	  movements	  as	  visible	   signs	  of	   a	  person’s	   character	   influence	  how	  someone	  appears	   to	  us.	  But	  signs	  of	  what	  kind	  of	  character	  do	  positively	  influence	  our	  judgements	  of	  beauty?	  	  Kant	  gives	  an	  answer	  to	  this	  question.	  The	  beauty	  of	  a	  human	  being	  is	  an	  example	  of	  dependent	  beauty.46	   A	   judgement	   of	   dependent	   beauty	   presupposes	   “a	   concept	   and	   the	   perfection	   of	   the	  object	   in	   accordance	   with	   it.”47	   What	   this	   means	   if	   the	   object	   is	   a	   human	   being,	   §	   17	   of	   the	  
Critique	  of	  the	  Power	  of	  Judgement	  makes	  clearer.	  The	  ideal	  of	  beauty	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  an	  ideal	  of	  human	  beauty.48	  The	  outward	  appearance	  of	  an	  ideally	  beautiful	  human	  being	  conforms	  to	  the	  aesthetic	  normal	   idea.	  This	   is	  the	   image	  of	  a	  standard,	  average	  human	  being.49	  Assumedly,	   this	  makes	  someone	  physically	  attractive.50	  But	  because	  perfection	  means	   that	  something	   fulfils	   its	  purpose	   and	   the	   purpose	   of	   a	   human	   being	   is	   being	   an	   end	   in	   herself,	   this	   is	   not	   enough.51	  Additionally,	   a	   virtuous	   character	   has	   to	   express	   itself	   in	   the	   outward	   appearance.	   So	   Kant	  argues	  for	  a	  kind	  of	  ‘moral	  character’-­‐expressionist	  theory	  of	  human	  beauty.52	  	  However,	   detached	   from	   a	   Kantian	   mind-­‐set,	   one	   can	   wonder	   whether	   only	   signs	   of	   moral	  character	  traits	  positively	  influence	  our	  judgement	  about	  human	  beauty.	  Think,	  for	  example,	  of	  how	  Tolstoy	  describes	  the	  first	  encounter	  between	  Vronsky	  and	  Anna:	  […]	  but	  felt	  he	  must	  glance	  at	  her	  once	  more;	  not	  that	  she	  was	  very	  beautiful,	  not	  on	  account	  of	   the	  elegance	  and	  modest	  grace	  which	  were	  apparent	   in	  her	  whole	   figure,	  but	  because	   in	  the	   expression	   of	   her	   charming	   face,	   as	   she	   passed	   close	   by	   him,	   there	   was	   something	  peculiarly	  caressing	  and	  soft.	  As	  he	  looked	  round,	  she	  too	  turned	  her	  head.	  Her	  shining	  gray	  eyes,	   that	   looked	   dark	   from	   the	   thick	   lashes,	   rested	  with	   friendly	   attention	   on	   his	   face,	   as	  though	  she	  were	  recognizing	  him,	  and	  then	  promptly	  turned	  away	  to	  the	  passing	  crowd,	  as	  though	   seeking	   someone.	   In	   that	   brief	   look	   Vronsky	   had	   time	   to	   notice	   the	   suppressed	  eagerness	  which	   played	   over	   her	   face,	   and	   flitted	   between	   the	   brilliant	   eyes	   and	   the	   faint	  smile	   that	   curved	   her	   red	   lips.	   It	   was	   as	   though	   her	   nature	   were	   so	   brimming	   over	   with	  something	  that	  against	  her	  will	  it	  showed	  itself	  now	  in	  the	  flash	  of	  her	  eyes,	  and	  now	  in	  her	  smile.	   Deliberately	   she	   shrouded	   the	   light	   in	   her	   eyes,	   but	   it	   shone	   against	   her	  will	   in	   the	  faintly	  perceptible	  smile.53	  Although	  Anna	  is	  doubtlessly	  a	  physically	  attractive	  woman,	  not	  her	  physical	  beauty	  fascinates	  Vronsky	  and	  draws	  him	  towards	  her.	  Rather	  it	  is	  what	  Vronsky	  believes	  to	  see	  of	  her	  character:	  her	   friendliness,	  her	  attentiveness,	  her	   liveliness,	  her	  eagerness,	   and	   so	  on.	  These	  are	  not	   in	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  See	  Kant,	  Kritik	  der	  Urteilskraft,	  AA	  V	  230.	  	  47	  See	  Kant,	  Critique	  of	  the	  Power	  of	  Judgment,	  AA	  V	  229.	  48	  Kant,	  Kritik	  der	  Urteilskraft,	  AA	  V	  233.	  49	  See	  Kant,	  Kritik	  der	  Urteilskraft,	  AA	  V	  234.	  	  50	  See	  Menninghaus,	  Das	  Versprechen	  der	  Schönheit,	  185.	  51	  See	  Kant,	  Kritik	  der	  Urteilskraft,	  AA	  V	  227;	  233.	  52	  See	  also	  Cooper,	  “Beautiful	  People,	  Beautiful	  Things,”	  248.	  	  53	  Tolstoy,	  Anna	  Karenina,	  part	  I,	  chapter	  18.	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  narrow	  sense	  moral	  character	  traits,	  but	  they	  are	  amiable,	  attractive	  character	  traits	  in	  the	  sense	  worked-­‐out	  in	  section	  II.	  I	  assume–but	  I	  cannot	  argue	  for	  this	  thesis	  in	  detail	  in	  this	  paper–that	  also	  bodily	  and	  facial	  expressions	  of	  such	  character	  traits	  positively	  influence	  our	  judgements	  of	  beauty.	  If	  human	  beauty	  is	  closely	  connected	  with	  attractiveness,	  it	  makes	  sense	  that	  bodily	  and	  facial	   expressions	   of	   amiable	   character	   traits	   matter	   for	   human	   beauty.	   So,	   according	   to	   this	  ‘beautiful	   character’-­‐expressionist	   view,	   a	   beautiful	   person	   is	   physically	   beautiful	   and	   shows	  signs	   of	   a	   beautiful	   character,	   more	   specific,	   she	   is	   highly	   physically	   attractive	   and	   displays	  visible	  signs	  of	  an	  amiable	  character.	  	  To	  sum	  up,	  this	  paper	  has	  distinguished	  three	  different	  perspectives	  on	  human	  beauty:	  a	  body-­‐centred,	  a	  dualist,	  and	  a	  character	  expressionist	  view.	  Depending	  on	  the	  context	  of	  utterance,	  a	  statement	  like	  “Person	  x	  is	  beautiful”	  can	  either	  mean	  that	  this	  person	  is	  physically	  attractive,	  or	  has	   a	   beautiful	   character,	   or	   both.	   But	   if	   one	   bears	   the	   inseperability-­‐problem	   in	   mind,	   a	  character-­‐expressionist	  interpretation	  is	  most	  likely	  to	  grasp	  the	  meaning	  of	  such	  an	  utterance.	  Furthermore,	   a	   character-­‐expressionist	   proposal	   has	   the	   advantage	   that	   it	   can	   capture	   two	  seemingly	   contradictory	   intuitions,	   namely	  how	  human	  beauty	   can	  be	  only	   skin	  deep	   and	   can	  come	  from	  within.	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